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Political Meetings of the National Socialists and the 
Increase of the NSDAP Vote 
Analyzing Conditions of Propaganda Effects 
with Aggregate Data 
Dieter Ohr* 
Abstract: This article seeks to explore the link between the 
campaign propaganda of the National Socialists and the 
electoral gains of the NSDAP. Two conditions are analyzed 
which might modify an effect of N S D A P propaganda on 
the par ty 's electoral scores. First, it is examined whether 
the impact of N S D A P meetings depends on the percentage 
of 'nationalist ic ' voters. Second, it is tested whether the 
public meetings of the N S D A P ' s right-wing competitors 
could restrain the effect of National Socialist campaign 
propaganda. The multivariate analysis of a sample of 226 
communities demonstrates that the N S D A P ' s campaign 
intensity significantly advanced the rise of the party. This 
influence of N S D A P propaganda is indeed the larger, the 
higher the percentage of 'nationalistic ' voters in a 
community. Moreover, the analysis reveals the effect of 
N S D A P propaganda to be greater in communities where 
the public activities of the par ty 's right-wing rivals were 
above the average. Overall, the findings presented in the 
article strongly suggest that NSDAP propaganda is an 
important predictor of the party 's increase. 
Address all communica t ions to: Dieter Ohr, University of Cologne , Institute of 
Applied Social Research , Greinstrasse 2 , 50939 Cologne , Germany . E-mail : 
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1. Introduction 
The dramatic rise of the N S D A P in the Weimar elections after 1928 is still 
puzzling. How can it be explained that the NSDAP succeeded in attracting up 
to almost 14 million German voters? How could it happen that, apparently, a 
large segment of the German electorate saw the National Socialists as the only 
solution to the Republic 's economic and political problems? Remembering that 
in 1928 the N S D A P still had been a small and dubious splinter group of the 
right wing, the party 's surge in the following years appears all the more 
astonishing. 
Empirical analyses on the social, occupational and denominational 
background of N S D A P voters and members which were published in the last 
years have greatly improved our knowledge on the factors predisposing for the 
Nazi party (cf. Falter 1991; Falter/Kater 1993; Winkler 1995; Muhlberger 
1997). As the knowledge on these predispositional factors seems to be 
well-established by now (see Kuchler 1992 for a review), further analyses may 
certainly add some details. It is not very likely, however, that important new 
elements will be added to the picture. 
Yet, the situation is quite different if we want to explain why especially the 
NSDAP, instead of another German party, achieved this dramatic electoral 
breakthrough. In answering this particular question, further variables have to be 
taken into account Obviously, there must have been some characteristic 
distinguishing the N S D A P from its competitors. Contemporary opinion (cf. 
Mierendorff 1930) soon identified the propaganda activities of the NSDAP as 
the most distinctive feature. Later on, presumably under the impression of the 
National Socialist state propaganda during the years of dictatorship, it was 
assumed that even before 1933 large parts of the German electorate had been 
manipulated and seduced by a powerful propaganda apparatus of the Nazis (cf. 
Bracher 1960: 123-124). Diametrically opposed to such a hypothesis of 
manipulation is an interpretation brought forward by Bessel (1980) who called 
the alleged impact of N S D A P propaganda a »myth«. Both interpretations 
represent rather extreme, and also not very convincing, ways of thinking about 
an effect of National Socialist propaganda. Assuming, for instance, 
manipulation of the German electorate by skilful agitators, ignores that the 
propensity to vote for the N S D A P differed markedly between the main blocs in 
the electorate. Moreover, both interpretations are largely based on mere 
speculation or, at best, on an impressionistic use of empirical data. While a 
multitude of regional and local studies published in the last three decades did 
focus on the role of Nazi propaganda (see for example Noakes 1971; Faris 
1975), they cannot be viewed as a strict test of a causal relationship between 
propaganda and voting behavior. 1 Only with the instruments of systematic 
1 The quantitative study of Wernette (1974) utilizes propaganda data which are 
seriously flawed (cf. Ohr (1997: 2 8 - 3 1 ) for a discussion of Wernet te ' s analysis) . As a 
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empirical analysis we can hope to shed some light on the causal question of 
propaganda impact. 
In this article I will attempt to explore whether an independent and 
significant influence of the N S D A P ' s political propaganda on the rise of the 
party can be established. It will be argued below that an impact of N S D A P 
propaganda is very likely to depend on certain conditions. Two conditions of an 
impact of propaganda will be discussed, first the percentage of nationalistic 
voters in the electorate, secondly the propaganda of the N S D A P ' s closest 
competitors on the right wing. 
Propaganda encompasses many different forms of political communicat ion. 
It is essential for the purposes of empirical analysis to define propaganda 
operationally. For the following analysis I will focus on the campaign 
propaganda of the NSDAP, i.e. the public political meetings the party held. The 
empirical analysis will be based on a sample of 226 communit ies, belonging to 
the German state of Hessen-Darmstadt. Using aggregate data on the number of 
political meetings and on the electoral results and social structure for these 
communit ies , I will analyze in particular whether the N S D A P meetings in the 
year 1931 could contribute to the National Socialist increase between the 
Reichstag election 1930 and the state election of Hessen-Darmstadt in 1931. 
2. Explaining the Impact of NSDAP Propaganda 
2.1 Conditions of an Impact of N S D A P Propaganda 
The question whether political propaganda can move voters to change their 
party choice has a long tradition in voting research (cf. Lazarsfeld et al. 1948 
for the classical study). On a more general level, communications research 
seeks to explore media effects on attitudes and behavior (cf. Katz 1987 for an 
overview). Much empirical work has been done, showing quite clearly that 
there can be no simple effect equation. The media in general and the 
propaganda of political parties in particular may indeed affect the political 
agenda of citizens and even alter political preferences to some extent, as a host 
of empirical analyses were able to establish. However, communicat ion effects 
are contingent upon a vast array of conditions, be it the political interest of the 
recipients or their political commitments . 
Taking this presumed conditionality of communicat ion effects into account, 
we have to ask which conditions are to be considered in the case of N S D A P 
propaganda. 2 In rational choice theory the basic ideological preferences of an 
consequence , those results of Wernette which concern the relat ionship be tween 
propaganda and voting behavior do not stand on safe ground. 
2 Cf. Ohr (1997: 3 5 - 6 5 ) for a detailed discussion of condit ions for p ropaganda effects; 
see also Jagodzinski /Ohr (1994) . 
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individual are a crucial condition (Downs 1957: 47), whereas group norms 
determine media effects in the communication studies of the Yale (Hovland et 
al. 1953) and Columbia tradition (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948). It therefore appears 
that in the first place a political party has to meet the ideological preferences of 
its target groups as well as it has to correspond to the norms of the relevant 
groups. 3 However, maintaining the right message will only be a necessary 
condition for effective persuasion in most cases. In order to persuade a 
recipient to accept the new creed, a communicator has to be trustworthy as well 
as competen t In short: a communicator has to be credible (Hovland et al. 
1953). Aside from choosing the ideological themes appropriate to the target 
groups, a political party is thus also obliged to create a favourable party image 
during the course of an election campaign. This is particularly true with regard 
to the challengers of the incumbent parties as voters can judge only the ' rea l ' 
performance of the incumbents. Evaluating how credible a challenging party is, 
voters have to rely on the campaign behavior of the respective party instead of 
using real data: Hence, campaigns can matter, especially in the case of 
challengers (Popkin 1991). 
How, and to what extent did the ideological content of N S D A P propaganda 
before 1933 meet the ideological preferences of the Weimar electorate? Which 
were the main features of Nazi party ideology and which part of the electorate 
had the greatest affinity to the themes of the National Socialists? For the region 
under scrutiny in the present article the study of Hennig (1983) on Hessen is 
particularly r e l e v a n t 4 Investigating the campaigns of the various nationalistic 
and right-wing parties, Hennig is able to show that ideological differences 
between the Nazis and the traditional right-wing parties were almost negligible. 
Nationalism, Anti-marxism, the concept of a national community 
( 'Volksgemeinschaft ') and a rejection of western democracy were no typical 
National Socialist principles. The traditional parties of the right wing, like the 
D N V P (Deutschnationale Volkspartei), the DVP (Deutsche Volkspartei), the 
CSVD (Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst) or the 'Hessischer Landbund ' , a party 
representing the interests of protestant farmers, equally endorsed these 
principles (Hennig 1983: 396) . 5 
As the ideological distance between the N S D A P and the traditional parties of 
the right wing was very small - if existent at all -, voters switching from the 
old right-wing parties to the N S D A P did not have to change their political 
3 Ressource mobil izat ion theory focusses on organizational variables but reaches quite 
similar conclusions with regard to the conditionality of propaganda effects (cf. 
McCar thy/Zald 1977). 
4 See Paul (1990) for an excellent account of N S D A P campaigns at the level of the 
whole G e r m a n Reich . 
5 The same seems to apply to other parties of the right wing: »The various right-wing 
splinter parties were no competi t ion since they agreed with the nat ional ism and 
anti-Social ism of the Nazis and were at best highly doubtful of the meri ts of 
democracy« (Allen 1984: 145). 
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convictions. There are two more reasons that made conversion of right-wing 
voters likely. First, if voting norms existed within the so-called national bloc, 
these norms were only negative in direction, against the two socialist parties 
and against the Catholic Centre party (Rohe 1992: 161). Secondly, the ties 
between the parties of the right wing and their voters seem to have been 
relatively weak. 6 
If then, all in all, the conditions for N S D A P propaganda to convert 
nationalistic, right-wing voters were particularly favorable, the question arises: 
What did the N S D A P distinguish from its closest competitors? Or, to put it 
differently: How could the National Socialists achieve the respectability which 
made them a credible option to large parts of the German electorate? Which 
factors are able to explain that a small and, equally important, very obscure 
splinter group of the right wing apparently succeeded in improving its public 
image? Finding an answer to these questions is essential, of course, as 
favorable conditions alone cannot explain the particular attractiveness of the 
N S D A P in the eyes of many voters: »Being well disposed towards certain parts 
of the Nazi message was not the same thing as being a Nazi« (Kershaw 1983: 
177). 7 
Contemporary opinion on the Nazi party reflected very clearly the fact that 
the N S D A P was markedly different with respect to its public appearance, its 
style and public presentation of politics. The scandal propaganda of the party 
and the violence of the paramilitary SA helped to create a climate of 
confrontation and put the Nazi party on the political agenda (Kershaw 1983: 
174). 8 Yet, probably the most important aspect of Nazi propaganda was its 
sheer quantity: 
»... the very quantity of Nazi propaganda amounted, in terms of the image 
created, to a qualitative distinction from other bourgeois parties. Based on 
their public image, the D N V P , DVP, and the various right-wing 
interest-organizations increasingly appeared puny competitors of the Nazis« 
(Kershaw 1983: 174). 
This immense intensity of N S D A P campaigning made the party visible in the 
first place, something the National Socialists desperately needed in the last 
years of the twenties. Secondly, the waves of political meetings made the 
N S D A P appear as an energetic and determined movement. In the eyes of large 
6 With regard to the ideological , socio-cultural and attitudinal factors ment ioned, the 
si tuation was markedly different in the bloc of political Catholicism, including the 
Centre party, and in the socialist b loc , including the Social Democra t ic Par ty (SPD) 
and the communis t party (KPD) . 
7 »The presence of an under lying nationalist predisposit ion, by itself, had no payoff for 
the party« (Hamil ton 1982: 311) . 
8 »The use of terror also made the Nazis appear powerful s ince ... mos t acts of Nazi 
terrorism went unpunished by the authorit ies. This facilitated the at tachment of voters 
to the Nazi movement« (Wemette 1974: 30) . 
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parts of the German electorate the Nazi party thus gained credibility and 
competence. The image of an obscure splinter party had been replaced by an 
image of determination (Hennig 1983; Kershaw 1983; Richter 1986; Paul 
1990). 9 
In summarizing the preceding discussion, the intensity of the N S D A P 
campaign seems to be the crucial aspect of its effectiveness. If the ideological 
preferences of voters were in line with the ideological themes of Nazi 
propaganda, the intensity of National Socialist propaganda could have induced 
voters to switch to the NSDAP. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
To test the assumption that the intensity of N S D A P campaigning fundamentally 
improved the National Socialists ' image in the electorate requires, ideally, data 
on the propaganda intensity as well as data on the individuals ' evaluations of 
the party. However, survey data on individual beliefs and attitudes are not 
available for the Weimar period. Therefore, aggregate data have to be used as a 
substitute. Consequently, the level of analysis and the level of the 
interpretations fall apart in the following analysis, as it is the case in most 
aggregate analyses. We have thus to deal with the well-known problem of 
ecological inference (Robinson 1950). Of course, a positive correlation 
between N S D A P propaganda and N S D A P election scores is only a very weak 
indication of a causal influence of N S D A P propaganda at the individual level. 
However, the problem of the ecological fallacy should not be exaggerated. The 
probability of the ecological fallacy greatly diminishes if the aggregate model 
is correctly specified, especially with regard to contextual influences. Seen in 
this light, there is nothing particular about the ecological inference problem: 
Generally, a model has to be specified correctly if we want to draw a causal 
inference. This rule holds for each empirical analysis, as well as for aggregate 
analyses. 
A second problem of causal inference might be more severe. This second 
problem is due to the fact that potentially relevant explanatory variables are not 
available for a quantitative analysis of persuasive communication in the 
Weimar period. Public propaganda of the Nazi party was only one form of 
political communication. A more informal, interpersonal form of 
communication might have been at least equally important as a path to 
persuade voters. Mobilization from 'be low' (Kershaw 1983: 163) could have 
been the main prelude to the surge of the NSDAP. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to test this hypothesis empirically, because data on indicators like, for 
instance, door-to-door canvassing (Kramer 1970/71), the infiltration of interest 
Allen reaches exactly this conclusion in his seminal study of the G e r m a n town 
Northeim: »... the pr ime effect attained by the Nazi meet ings was achieved s imply by 
their numbers . If you wanted an energetic party this was it« (Allen 1984: 143). 
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organizations, or the bloc recruitment of groups in the electorate (Oberschall 
1973) are not available. If, as cannot be ruled out, public propaganda of the 
Nazis and mobilization from the 'grassroots ' were intimately related, a causal 
interpretation of propaganda effects will be risky. 1 0 
Keeping these two basic methodological problems in mind, our central 
hypothesis can be formulated as follows: As the National Socialists ' ' image of 
determination' developed with the intensity of N S D A P propaganda, the 
increase of National Socialist strength should have grown - ceteris paribus -
with the intensity of N S D A P propaganda. This positive effect of N S D A P 
campaign propaganda on the par ty 's increase should be the larger, the larger 
the nationalistic potential. I will use the term nationalistic potential in the 
following for that conglomerate of ideological orientations in the electorate 
which corresponds to the themes of the Nazi party. Hence, in line with the 
theoretical approaches mentioned above, a conditional effect of N S D A P 
propaganda is to be expected (Ohr 1994; Ohr 1997). 
Until now I have ignored the propaganda of the N S D A P ' s right-wing rivals. 
However, the propaganda of the N S D A P constituted only one part of an 
election campaign. And the activities of the N S D A P ' s right-wing competitors 
in particular could have had an influence on the impact of Nazi propaganda. 
Yet, the direction of such an influence is difficult to predict in advance. On the 
one hand, it seems fairly natural to assume that an intensive right-wing activity 
should have limited the effect of National Socialist agitation. On the other 
hand, it also appears conceivable that the ideologically similar propaganda of 
the traditional right-wing parties could have prepared the ground for the 
N S D A P . How, and to what extent, the propaganda of the traditional right-wing 
parties could modify the impact of the N S D A P ' s public meetings has to be 
decided by empirical means. 
Campaign propaganda of the N S D A P is an independent variable with regard 
to the N S D A P gains. Even though this is the main analytical perspective in the 
present article, it seems to be fruitful as well to examine the antecedents of 
N S D A P propaganda. If the strength of the nationalistic potential was in fact a 
crucial condition for the success of National Socialist propaganda, it was 
imperative for the party to take this restriction into account. Assuming that 
strategic considerations played an important role in the party, it can be expected 
that the National Socialists concentrated their campaign upon the regions most 
favorable to a success of propaganda. 
For a m o r e comprehens ive discussion of methodological p rob lems in analyzing 
propaganda effects with aggregate data see Ohr (1997: 6 6 - 8 0 ) . 
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3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Data and Measures 
To test the hypotheses outlined above, data on the election scores of the 
N S D A P as well as data on its campaign propaganda are needed for a 
sufficiently large number of aggregate units. Additionally, for the multivariate 
analyses data on further variables, e.g. social-structural data, must be available. 
The following analysis is based on a sample of 226 communities, including all 
communities of the four counties Bensheim, Heppenheim, Friedberg, and 
Schotten. These four counties belonged to the German state of 
Hessen-Darmstadt. Overall, the sample is more rural than the German Reich on 
the average. But the election results in the region are fairly similar to the whole 
Reich. Additionally, important relationships, e.g. the relationship between the 
N S D A P vote and the percentage of protestants, do not markedly differ between 
the Reich level and the sample (Ohr 1997: 100-107). For these 226 
communities I have compiled a data set on the political meetings of all relevant 
political parties (cf. Ohr 1997: 108-118 for a description of the data and 
information on their reliability) for the years 1931 and 1932." This data set has 
been matched with data on election results and the social and denominational 
structure of the 226 communi t ies . 1 2 
For the present analysis I will focus on the state election of 
Hessen-Darmstadt in November 1931, 15th. The indicator for electoral success 
of the Nazi party will be the change (in percentage points) between the 
Reichstag election in September 1930 and the state election in November 
1931. 1 3 This change variable will be the main dependent variable in the 
following analysis. 
Turning to the main explanatory variable, the measure of N S D A P 
propaganda intensity takes the absolute frequency of N S D A P meetings in a 
community between April and November 1931 as a starting po in t Y e t a 
reasonable measure of National Socialist propaganda intensity has to take into 
account that, say, ten meetings in a middle town mean something quite 
different than ten meetings in a small village. Therefore, we will get a better 
indicator for the intensity of N S D A P propaganda by dividing the number of 
meetings of a community by the number of eligible voters. Multiplying this 
1 1 The data on political meet ings were collected during the research project for my 
doctoral thesis (Ohr 1997). 
1 2 I would like to thank Jürgen Falter (University of Mainz) for providing me his 
communi ty data set for the whole state of Hessen-Darmstadt . Meanwhi le this data set 
is available at the Z A / Z H S F at the Universi ty of Cologne . 
1 3 The percentages for the N S D A P were calculated with the number of eligible voters as 
the basis . Note that the N S D A P change is calculated by subtracting the smaller 
percentages of 1930 from the larger percentages from 1931 . Thus , a gain of the 
N S D A P between the two elections is reflected by a posit ive change value. 
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term with 1000 gives the number of political meetings in a community per 
1000 eligible voters in the 1931 campaign (cf. Jagodzinski/Ohr 1994: 580; Ohr 
1997: 125-128). In order to mitigate outlier effects, the propaganda variable 
was transformed for the regression analyses (cf. sections 3.3 and 3.4) by means 
of the logarithmic function to the base e, that is the natural logarithm. 
The second main explanatory variable in the empirical analysis will be the 
nationalistic potential in a community as it is expected to be a crucial condition 
for the impact of N S D A P meetings. Of course, no direct measure of this 
potential can be devised with aggregate data on election results. If it is 
assumed, however, that election results reflect at least to some extent voters ' 
ideological orientations, it is possible to find an indirect measure. One possible 
measure could be the percentage of the right-wing parties in a former election 
(Jagodzinski/Ohr 1994: 579). But election results depend not only on 
ideological orientations. Short-term factors like, for instance, competence 
evaluations of political parties or political scandals etc. can also influence the 
election scores of parties. A better indicator for the nationalistic potential is 
probably the propensity of a community to vote for Hindenburg in the 
presidential election in April 1925. Hindenburg apparently succeeded in 
collecting the various nationalistic and anti-republican groups for the first t ime 
in the Weimar period (Falter 1991: 363). In the empirical analysis I will 
therefore use the percentage of eligible voters who voted for Hindenburg in 
1925 . 1 4 
Two indicators of the social and denominational structure will be employed 
in the empirical analysis. First, the importance of agriculture in a community is 
measured by the percentage of eligible voters working in the agrarian sector, 
including their families ( 'Berufszugehörige Personen ' ) , with the total 
population as the percentage base. Secondly, the importance of protestant 
culture is operationalized by the percentage of protestants in the population. 
Finally, there might be differences in voting behavior which cannot be 
explained by the variables of the model. Such differences might be due to the 
effects of unmeasured variables like, for example, voting traditions of a region. 
In order to capture the effects of unmeasured variables, 0 - l - c o d e d dummy 
variables for the three counties Bensheim, Friedberg and Schotten were used in 
the regression analyses. The fourth county, Heppenheim, was the reference 
category. 
3.2 N S D A P Propaganda Intensity: A First Impression 
According to the theoretical considerations, the intensity of N S D A P 
propaganda was the crucial aspect of its impact. An extremely high intensity 
1 4 The bivariate pearson correlation be tween the N S D A P increase from 1930 to 1931 
and the Hindenburg vote in 1925 is +0 .82 , a correlat ion no other predictor of the 
Nat ional Socialist increase attains. 
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may have convinced nationalistic voters that their political aims could be 
advanced best by the Nazi party. Therefore, examining the degree of N S D A P 
propaganda intensity seems to be a natural first step in the empirical analysis. 
Do the propaganda figures for the 226 communities indeed exhibit a qualitative 
distinction between the Nazi propaganda and the propaganda of the other 
parties, in particular with regard to the traditional right-wing parties, as 
Kershaw (1983: 174) assumes? 
Figure 1 shows the number of political meetings for the campaign before the 
state election of Hessen-Darmstadt in November 1931 (cf. Ohr 1997: 146). As 
Figure 1 clearly demonstrates, there is in fact a qualitative difference between 
the campaign of the Nazi party and their closest competitors in the national 
bloc. In the seven months before the election the National Socialists were able 
to hold 449 meet ings . 1 5 Only the communist party (KPD) could reach this 
extremely high level with 442 meetings and even surpass the N S D A P in the 
two weeks before election day (201 communist meetings vs. 148 N S D A P 
meetings). While the communist and the National Socialist patterns of meetings 
over t ime look very similar, the right-wing rivals of the N S D A P were virtually 
not visible in the public domain. Only in the first two weeks in November -
election day had been November, 15th - the parties of the national bloc 
appeared on the political map. Nevertheless, the overall picture does not 
change: With regard to the nationalistic segment of the ideological market there 
was only one party to dominate the political agenda: the NSDAP. National 
Socialist propaganda reached a very high level of intensity, and it was also 
almost permanent. The contrast to the traditional parties of the national bloc 
could hardly be greater. Seen in the light of these data, it is not at all surprising 
that the Nazi party gained visibility and reputation in the nationalistic part of 
the electorate. 
Let us now turn from the level of N S D A P propaganda intensity to its 
regional structure. Since from a strategical point of view regions with a high 
nationalistic potential promised to be the most favorable ground for the Nazi 
party, it was expected that the N S D A P recognized this and focussed on mainly 
nationalistic areas. To examine this hypothesis, Figure 2 shows the intensity of 
N S D A P campaign propaganda for four different levels of the nationalistic 
potential (cf. Ohr 1994: 656; Ohr 1997: 155). Figure 2 exhibits a strong 
relationship between NSDAP propaganda intensity and the nationalistic 
potential. As the nationalistic potential in the sample is 32.8 percent on the 
average, Figure 2 reveals a clear divide at approximately this mean value. If the 
potential is less than 30 percent, the N S D A P held less than two meetings per 
1000 eligible voters. The situation looks fairly different if the nationalistic 
potential is above average. In those communities with a percentage of 
nationalistic voters above 30% the measure for campaign intensity more than 
1 5 Fo r the month of April 1931 only a few meet ings were documented . The N S D A P , for 
instance, held only five meet ings in Apri l . 
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Figure 1 
Political Meetings from May to November 1931 
(Counties Bensheim, Heppenheim, Friedberg, and Schotten) 
N a t i o n a l B l o c : D N V P + D V P + C S V D + L a n d b u n d . 
doubles. Whether the relationship is in fact due to a rational propaganda 
strategy of the Nazi party cannot be decided with the data at hand. Another 
interpretation seems possible as well. In communities where the nationalistic 
potential had been high the N S D A P was also more likely to have party activists 
at its disposal. It is thus conceivable that the relationship in Figure 2 simply 
reflects a more favorable opportunity structure in nationalistic communit ies . Of 
course, both interpretations need not hold exclusively but can complement each 
other. 
The findings presented in this section confirm that two important conditions 
for an effect of N S D A P propaganda were met. First, the National Socialists ' 
political meetings reached a quantity that certainly helped to improve the 
par ty 's judgements in the nationalistic part of the electorate. Secondly, the 
propaganda waves of the N S D A P were not randomly distributed but had a clear 
regional structure. Communities where an anti-marxist and nationalistic 
ideology prevailed saw a much higher intensity of Nazi propaganda than 
communit ies where such an outlook had only marginal importance. 
Let us now examine the possible effect of the N S D A P campaign 
propaganda. 1 6 For the purposes of a first graphical test of the conditional 
propaganda hypothesis I have dichotomized both the propaganda intensity of 
the N S D A P and the nationalistic potential at their mean values . 1 7 In combining 
these two dichotomous variables, the 226 communities are split into four 
groups. In order to get an impression of the effect of NSDAP propaganda I will 
compare the difference in the N S D A P gains between the communities with a 
nationalistic potential below average (groups 1 and 2) and the communities 
with a nationalistic potential above average (groups 3 and 4). Figure 3 depicts 
the N S D A P gains from 1930 to 1931 for the four groups of the sample (cf. Ohr 
1994: 657). As Figure 3 shows, N S D A P propaganda seems to have made a 
difference. The N S D A P ' s average increase from 1930 to 1931 is clearly higher 
in communities where the propaganda intensity of the National Socialists was 
above its mean value. In communities where the nationalistic potential was low 
the par ty 's gain rises, on average, from 4.2 (low propaganda intensity) to 8.1 
percentage points (high propaganda intensity). The effect of National Socialist 
campaign intensity is still higher in communities where the nationalistic 
potential was above the average value. Here the difference in the N S D A P 
In this article only direct effects of N S D A P propaganda are analyzed. Of course, 
p ropaganda might also affect voting behavior in an indirect way: As is well known , 
propaganda can activate the political interest of the citizens (Lazarsfeld et al . 1948) 
and, as a consequence , mobil ize to participate in political elections (cf. O h r 1997: 
176). 
The (weighted) mean of the number of N S D A P meet ings per 1000 eligible voters is 
2 . 7 1 , the m e a n of the nationalistic potential equals 3 2 . 8 % . In Figure 2 low 
propaganda intensity denotes an intensity below or equal the mean of 2 . 7 1 , high 
intensity a va lue above 2 .71 . Likewise , low nationalistic potential designates a value 
be low or equal 3 2 . 8 % , high potential a value above 3 2 . 8 % . 
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increase amounts to more than six points if we compare communities with a 
low intensity (18.0 percentage points) to communities with a high intensity 
(24.3). 
Two points should be noted when judging the results in Figure 3. First, the 
pattern clearly supports the notion that N S D A P propaganda made an important 
contribution to the party 's electoral increase. Secondly, the findings are in line 
with a conditional hypothesis of propaganda effects. 
3.3 A Conditional Model for the Impact of National Socialist Propaganda 
The results of the last section clearly supported two of our assumptions on the 
intensity of N S D A P propaganda: Concentrating the public activities on 
communities where nationalistic sentiments were strong, N S D A P propaganda 
seems to have been especially effectual in these communit ies . Yet, at least for 
two reasons graphical analyses as in Figure 2 and Figure 3 cannot substitute a 
full-fledged statistical analysis. First, variables like the nationalistic potential or 
the propaganda intensity of the N S D A P are truly quantitative variables. In 
building categorical variables from quantitative variables, information gets lost. 
Additionally, the choice of the cutting points is always more or less arbitrary. 
Secondly, a thorough analysis of N S D A P propaganda - of its antecedents as 
well as its possible effects - has to take further explanatory variables into 
account. Ignoring important control variables may produce spurious results. 
In this section and in the following section I will examine the hypotheses on 
N S D A P propaganda by means of multiple regression analyses. As a first step in 
the multivariate analysis I will take up again the question of whether the public 
meetings of the N S D A P followed a certain regional structure. According to the 
bivariate pattern in Figure 2, the propaganda intensity of the National Socialists 
rose with the degree of the nationalistic potential. Table 1 displays the estimates 
for a multivariate model which seeks to explain the regional structure of 
N S D A P intensity (cf. Ohr 1997: 165). As in all following analyses standard 
ordinary least squares regression was used to estimate the coefficients. 1 8 
Table 1 shows three predictors of the N S D A P propaganda intensity to be 
significant in the multivariate model: the percentage of protestants, the 
importance of agriculture in a community and, finally, the percentage of the 
N S D A P in the Reichstag election 1928. All effects are positive. Thus , the 
Each communi ty in the sample was weighted by the respect ive number of el igible 
voters . Divid ing the eligible number of voters of each communi ty by the arithmetic 
m e a n of the number of eligible voters, the (unweighted) m e a n of the weight ing 
factors equals exactly 1.0 and the number of cases in the sample (226) remains 
unchanged . For an effect to show up in Table 1 or in the fol lowing tables at least the 
.05 significance level had to be attained, with the except ion of the intercept. For the 
d u m m y variables of the counties a two-tailed test was used as the direct ion of an 
effect could not be predicted in advance. All other effects were tested with a 
one-tailed test. 
4 1 
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Table 1 
Determinants of N S D A P Propaganda Intensity 
Dependent variable: NSDAP Propaganda Intensity 1931 
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients 
Independent variable 
Importance Agriculture +0.011 
(+4.97) 
Percentage Protestants +0.006 
(+5.13) 
N S D A P Percentage 1928 +0.085 
(+2.97) 
Intercept +0.273 
(+2.93) 
R2; 0.284 
Adjusted R 2 : 0.274 
n: 226 
T-Values in Parentheses; communities weighted by the number of eligible voters 1931. 
N S D A P was most likely to hold public meetings in protestant and rural 
communities as well as in those regions where the party already had been 
strong in 1928. Even though in multivariate analysis the nationalistic potential 
has no significant effect on propaganda intensity, the regression model is 
perfectly compatible with the pattern in Figure 2: The N S D A P concentrated its 
propaganda activities heavily on those communities where nationalistic 
sentiments had been strong. As the denominational and social-structural 
background of the nationalistic potential is predominantly protestant and, to a 
somewhat lesser degree, also rural , 1 9 the results of Figure 2 and Table 1 do not 
contradict each other. Rather, both patterns can be understood as different 
perspectives of one phenomenon. 
The positive relationship between N S D A P strength in 1928 and National 
Socialist propaganda intensity points to a relevant precondition of propaganda 
activities I have already alluded to: In order to conduct an election campaign, a 
political party is in need of activists who are willing to do the work involved. 
Together with the indicator variables for the counties more than 75 percent of the 
variance of the nationalistic potential can be explained with the percentage of 
protestants and the impor tance of agriculture (no table, cf. Ohr 1997: 165). 
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Hence, if the N S D A P strength in the Reichstag election of 1928 is viewed as a 
measure of party activists a plausible interpretation of the relationship can be 
given. 
Overall, the bivariate and the multivariate results on the regional structure of 
N S D A P meetings are in line with an assumption that the Nazi party at least in 
part strategically planned its campaigning. Concentrating the public activities 
on those communities where the odds appeared to be in the par ty 's favor, the 
National Socialists met a crucial condition for an impact of their propaganda. 
Any analysis of the relationship between propaganda and voting behavior 
has to take into account that the electoral fortunes of a party do not depend on 
propaganda alone. Strictly testing the impact of propaganda thus implies that 
relevant explanatory variables of voting behavior are incorporated in the model . 
Not all variables thought to be substantively important are accessible, however, 
as was already pointed out. Regarding the explanation of the N S D A P increase 
between 1930 and 1931, apart from propaganda three variables were assumed 
to have relevant influences: the nationalistic potential, the mobilization of 
former non-voters and, finally, the strength of the N S D A P at the Reichstag 
election in 1930. 
The nationalistic potential measures right-wing and nationalistic beliefs and 
values. A strong effect of the nationalistic potential might thus testify to the 
importance of ideological distances for the voting decision. Nationalistic voters 
might have cast their ballot for the N S D A P because the Nazi party 's ideology 
was closest to their political views. An interpretation focussing exclusively on 
ideological distances is not very convincing, however, because the N S D A P and 
its right-wing rivals differed only in nuances, as was argued above (cf. for 
instance Hennig 1983; Allen 1984). The indicator may also measure processes 
of 'grassroots ' mobilization in the nationalistic part of the electorate, of course 
in a very indirect way. Local notables, for instance, who made their conversion 
to the Nazi party public may have initiated processes of mobilization from 
below (cf. Kershaw 1983; Allen 1984). As a consequence, a positive effect of 
the nationalistic potential on the increase of the N S D A P vote can be expected. 
Secondly, the National Socialists' strength in the 1930 Reichstag election 
should have limited the par ty 's gains between 1930 and 1931 since, in general, 
large gains will be harder to achieve for a political party if its level is already 
high. Thirdly, mobilization of former non-voters which is measured by the 
change in turnout should at least in part have supported the growth of the Nazi 
party from 1930 to 1931. Finally, dummy variables for the counties of the 
analyzed region were employed as proxies for the influences of unmeasured 
variables. 
Which role does the indicator for the intensity of NSDAP propaganda play in 
a model including the explanatory variables mentioned? Table 2 shows the 
multiple regression estimates for two different models, first an additive model 
of propaganda impact (left-hand side), second a conditional model for the 
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influence of N S D A P propaganda (right-hand side) (cf. Ohr 1997: 176) . 2 0 
Although the conditional propaganda model is theoretically more sound than an 
additive model , it is sensible to estimate also the additive model for the purpose 
of comparison. To model the effect of N S D A P propaganda conditionally, I 
have created a productterm of the nationalistic potential and the intensity of 
N S D A P propaganda. 2 1 
If we estimate a base model including all explanatory variables listed in 
Table 2, except the indicators of N S D A P propaganda, the R 2 -measure achieves 
a very high value. More than 80 percent of the variance in N S D A P gains can be 
explained with the nationalistic potential, the change in turnout, the N S D A P 
strength in 1930 and, finally, the dummy variable for the county of Bensheim. 
Thus, there is not much variance left for the propaganda variable. Additionally, 
as we know from Table 1, N S D A P meetings were most likely to be held in 
protestant and rural communit ies, also in communities where National Socialist 
activists were living. Protestantism and the importance of agriculture are not 
only important predictors of N S D A P propaganda. Both factors have relevant 
direct and indirect effects on the other explanatory variables of the N S D A P 
propaganda increase as well (cf. Ohr 1997). As a consequence, the change in 
the R 2 -measure cannot be large if propaganda is added to a model explaining 
the N S D A P ' s electoral scores. 
To begin with the additive model , the (unadjusted) R 2 rises significantly by 
1.5 percentage points if we incorporate the N S D A P campaign intensity in the 
model . As the mean value of the (logarithmic) N S D A P propaganda intensity 
equals 1.04, the regression coefficient of +2.322 approximately indicates the 
effect of N S D A P meetings (in percentage points) if we compare a community 
without N S D A P meetings to a community with an average value of N S D A P 
propaganda. 2 2 
The (unadjusted) R 2 increases by another 0.8 percentage points if the product 
term of N S D A P campaign intensity and nationalistic potential is added to the 
model . Even though the two component variables of this term are already in the 
model , this increase is significant (t=3.34, no table). However, as the main 
effect for the N S D A P meetings is no longer significant in this case it was 
removed from the model. Comparing then the base model without propaganda 
M a n y different regression models have been estimated in order to test the direct 
influences of other variables as well . N o n e of these variables, including the 
impor tance of agriculture, the percentage of protestants, or the percentage of the 
N S D A P in 1928, proved to have significant direct effects. 
In general , in an addit ive model the effect of a predictor variable does not differ 
be tween the values of another variable in the model . An additive p ropaganda model 
implies in part icular that an effect of propaganda does not depend on the degree of 
the nationalistic potential . 
The bivariate pearson correlation be tween the measure for the N S D A P ' s propaganda 
intensity and the N S D A P increase be tween 1930 and 1931 equals +0.52 and is highly 
significant. 
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Table 2 
N S D A P Change and N S D A P Propaganda 
D e p e n d c n t V a r i a b l e : N S D A P 1 9 3 1 % - N S D A P 1 9 3 0 % 
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients 
Independent Variable (Additive Model) (Conditional Model) 
Nationalistic Potential +0.453 +0.367 
(+19.09) (+12.06) 
N S D A P Propaganda Intensity 1931 +2.322 _a 
(+4.31) 
N S D A P Propaganda Intensity 1931 
*Nationalistic Potential +0.073 
(+5.52) 
A Turnout 30/31 +0.486 +0.484 
(+8.96) (+9.19) 
N S D A P Percentage 1930 - 0 . 3 4 0 - 0 . 3 4 4 
( -7 .63) ( -7 .91) 
County Benshe im - 2 . 8 2 3 - 2 . 8 2 5 
( -3 .49) ( -3 .58) 
Intercept +0.768 +3.085 
(+0.86) (+3.68) 
R 2 : 0.828 0.836 
Adjusted R 2 : 0.824 0.832 
n: 226 226 
T - V a l u e s i n p a r e n t h e s e s : c o m m u n i t i e s w e i g h t e d b y the n u m b e r o f e l i g i b l e v o t e r s 1 9 3 1 : a : not s i g n i f i c a n t 
with the conditional model in Table 2 (right-hand side), the change in the 
R 2 -measure amounts to 2.3 percentage points and is highly significant (t=5.52). 
The findings in Table 2 and in Figure 3 are very similar. N S D A P propaganda 
intensity in the year 1931 seems to have made an important contribution to the 
party 's increase between 1930 (Reichstag election) and 1931 (state election 
Hessen-Darmstadt). This holds in particular if the effect of the N S D A P 
meetings is modelled conditionally. The conditional propaganda model is not 
only theoretically superior to an additive model. It also proves to be the better 
model if statistical criteria are applied. 
Before we will examine the conditional effect of NSDAP meetings in greater 
detail, let us briefly comment on the effects of the other explanatory variables 
in the model. As was expected, the increase in turnout from 1930 to 1931 is in 
fact positively related to the rise of the NSDAP. The more former non-voters 
4 6 
were mobilized to participate in the Hessen state election, the greater were the 
gains of the Nazi party in a communi ty . 2 3 It is apparent in comparing the 
coefficients for voter mobilization between the additive and the conditional 
model that the effects are virtually identical. 
As the N S D A P was the second largest party in Germany since the Reichstag 
election of September 1930, it does not come as a surprise that the level of the 
N S D A P in 1930 has a strong negative effect on the gains at the Hessen election 
in 1931. The higher the N S D A P strength had been in 1930, the smaller were 
the increases of the N S D A P vote in 1931. Here again the coefficients do not 
differ between the additive and the conditional model. 
Turning now to the relationship between the nationalistic potential and the 
N S D A P increase, Table 2 exhibits very strong positive effects of the variable in 
both models . For example, according to the additive model , a difference in the 
nationalistic potential between two communities of, say, 30 percentage points 
corresponds to a difference in the N S D A P increase of 13.6 percentage points. 
What does this very strong effect of the nationalistic potential suggest? If, as 
was argued above, the nationalistic potential is in fact an indirect measure for 
grassroots mobilization, the importance of informal face-to-face 
communicat ion is underlined. Then, at least for the time period analyzed, 
'mobilization from be low' (Kershaw 1983) is essential for an understanding of 
the N S D A P increase. This is not to say, however, that the public propaganda 
activities of the N S D A P had nothing to do with these processes of mobilization 
as »... the important role of ' informal agitation' testifies itself to the success of 
the Party in creating an attractive and distinctive image for the NSDAP« 
(Kershaw 1983: 173). It can thus be speculated that National Socialist 
propaganda of a former period, e.g. between 1928 and 1930, did play an 
important role in setting such processes of grassroots mobilization into 
mot ion . 2 4 Unfortunately, it is not possible to test this conjecture as neither data 
on propaganda for this period nor more direct indicators for grassroots 
mobilization are available. 
Returning to the N S D A P propaganda intensity in the election campaign of 
1931, I will now examine more closely the implications of the conditional 
propaganda model. From Table 2 we know that N S D A P meetings had a fairly 
strong effect on the increase of the party 's vote, especially if the effect is 
modelled conditionally. Whether an effect of a variable is judged to be strong 
The change in turnout has been calculated as the difference in the percentage of 
non-voters 1930 and non-voters in 1931 . The mean change from 1930 to 1931 is 
posi t ive (mean: +1 .80 percentage points) . 
»The convers ion of local worthies to Naz i sm and their subsequent personal and social 
' indirect propaganda ro le ' is unthinkable without the direct propaganda which m a d e 
them aware of Naz i sm in the first place. Above all i t was the growing feeling of 
strength and purpose attached to the Par ty - a direct creat ion of agitational methods in 
the first instance - which persuaded many ' respectable c i t izens ' that this was a party 
that mat tered« (Kershaw 1983: 174). 
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depends, of course, on the criterion we use. In interpreting Table 2, I have 
concentrated on the change in the R 2 -measure if the indicator for N S D A P 
propaganda is added to the model. Even though the model without propaganda 
already explained more than 80 percent of the variance in N S D A P gains, the 
conditional propaganda model raised the R 2 by another 2.3 percentage points. 
Measuring the impact of N S D A P meetings exclusively in terms of the 
change in the R 2 -measure would be unsatisfactory for at least two reasons. 
First, as we argued above, the NSDAP gains and the propaganda intensity can 
be explained in part with the same explanatory variables. The inclusion of 
N S D A P propaganda in a model explaining the party 's electoral scores can thus 
not add much to the explained variance. Secondly, rather than focussing on a 
rather abstract measure like the change in explained variance it will probably be 
more illuminating if we look at N S D A P propaganda in terms of the increases of 
the party vote. Which increase in the N S D A P vote between 1930 and 1931 is to 
be expected, ceteris paribus, if the intensity of N S D A P propaganda varies? 
Figure 4 displays the estimates for the expected values of the N S D A P 
increase between 1930 and 1931 (cf. Ohr 1994: 662; 1997: 186) . 2 5 Four effect 
curves are shown in the picture, each curve representing a different degree of 
the nationalistic potential. The effect curve just below the abscissa reveals one 
important implication of the conditional propaganda model: N S D A P 
propaganda affected voting behavior only if the nationalistic potential was not 
totally absen t More generally, as was hypothesized, the effect of the N S D A P 
activity on the NSDAP gains was in fact the greater, the higher the nationalistic 
potential in a community. Graphically, this conditionality can be seen by 
comparing the slopes of the effect curves for NSDAP propaganda. The higher 
the percentage of nationalistic voters, the steeper is the effect curve of N S D A P 
propaganda. 2 6 
We get an impression of an average effect of N S D A P propaganda if we take 
a value for the nationalistic potential around the average of 32.8%, say 30%. If 
the nationalistic potential is 30%, the predicted N S D A P gain rises from 
approximately 11 percentage points (no N S D A P meeting in a community) to an 
expected increase of nearly 16 percentage points (ten meetings per 1000 
eligible voters). By implication of the conditional model, this already quite 
large effect of the N S D A P activity still grows with the strength of the 
nationalistic potential. Comparing again communities without N S D A P 
meetings to communities with ten meetings per 1000 eligible voters, the effect 
of N S D A P propaganda amounts to nearly 9 percentage points if the 
nationalistic potential equals 50 percent 
2 5 The est imates of the expected values were calculated with the unstandardized 
regress ion coefficients of the conditional model (cf. Table 2, r ight-hand side). T h e 
other predictors of the N S D A P increase have been fixed (cf. Figure 4 for the values 
ass igned) . 
2 6 The relationships be tween campaign intensity and N S D A P increase have a nonl inear 
shape , because the N S D A P propaganda values were transformed by the logarithmic 
function. 
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What are the implications of these findings? Given the main result that 
National Socialist propaganda was particularly successful in those communities 
where nationalistic convictions had been strong, our interpretation of N S D A P 
propaganda is clearly supported: An intensive and also permanent campaign 
propaganda fundamentally improved the N S D A P ' s image in the nationalistic 
part of the electorate and could thus contribute to the dramatic rise of the party 
in the elections. 
3.4 The Impact of N S D A P Meetings and the Campaign Propaganda of the 
N S D A P ' s Right-Wing Competitors 
In this section the campaign propaganda of the traditional right-wing parties 
comes into play. These parties and the National Socialists were competing in 
the same segment of the ideological marke t Taking this competition as given, it 
seems reasonable to surmise that the effect of National Socialist campaigning 
was dependent in some measure on its competi tors ' activities. Assuming that an 
effect of Nazi propaganda may be contingent on the level of right-wing 
propaganda, implies, in technical terms, an interaction effect between the 
propaganda of the N S D A P and that of its closest rivals. Yet, this is not the only 
possible influence right-wing activities could have had on the election scores of 
the Nazi party. It seems likely as well that the campaign activity of the 
traditional national parties could have strengthened the ties to its followers, 
quite independently from the intensity of the N S D A P ' s activity. Hence, an 
additive effect of right-wing campaign activities on the N S D A P vote should 
also be taken into account. 
In order to find out whether, and how, the propaganda of the right-wing 
parties affected the N S D A P gains between 1930 and 1931 in general and the 
effect of N S D A P propaganda in particular, the following procedure was 
employed: The campaign intensity of the traditional right-wing parties - again 
including the DNVP, the DVP, the CSVD, and the Landbund - was 
dichotomized at its mean value. 2 7 If the acitivity of the national parties in a 
community was above the mean value, this community was coded with a ' 1 ' , 
communities below or equal the mean were assigned the value zero. This 
dichotomous indicator of right-wing propaganda was then multiplied with the 
intensity of N S D A P activity to model the interaction between the two variables. 
Both effects of right-wing activity prove to be significant if they are added to 
the additive propaganda model we already know from the last section (Table 2, 
left-hand side). 
Table 3 shows the regression estimates for this model in comparison to the 
additive model (cf. Ohr 1997: 216). An interesting effect pattern emerges for 
the political meetings of the four right-wing parties. While the additive term for 
2 7 The m e a n of the r ight-wing campaign intensity in 1931 was 0.44 (relative and loga-
r i thmic propaganda value) . 
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right-wing activity has a negative sign, the sign of the interaction term is 
positive. Hence, the propaganda of the traditional parties of the national bloc 
appears to have limited the N S D A P gains as the regression coefficient for the 
additive term (-4.467) indicates. This restraining influence on the electoral 
success of the Nazi party does only apply, however, if the level of N S D A P 
activity is low. With a rising level of National Socialist campaign intensity the 
conditional effect of right-wing activity changes its sign. N o w the composite 
effect of right-wing propaganda is positive with respect to the N S D A P ga ins . 2 8 
Figure 5 represents this effect pattern with the two effect curves of N S D A P 
propaganda intensity. The curve with the smaller slope stands for the effect 
2 8 The condit ional effect of right-wing activity combines the two regression coefficients 
for the parties of the national bloc. 
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curve of communities with right-wing propaganda below or equal the mean 
value. Communities where the public activity of the four national parties was 
above the average are depicted by the steeper curve. 
As Figure 5 shows, the two effect curves cross each other at approximately a 
value of 3.7 N S D A P meetings per 1000 eligible voters. Below this value an 
intensive propaganda of the traditional right-wing parties seems to have 
restrained the N S D A P gains, above this value a high activity of the national 
parties seems to have further boosted the NSDAP increase between 1930 and 
1931. It can be presumed therefore that the propaganda of the N S D A P ' s 
right-wing competitors could have prepared the ground for the National 
Socialists under certain circumstances. Deciding between parties which were 
almost indistinguishable in ideological terms, voters may have choosen the 
N S D A P because this party had gained an image of determination by means of 
its intensive propaganda campaign. 
The right-hand side of Table 3 represents a second specification of the 
conditional propaganda model. Comparing the effects of both conditional 
models , i.e. the model from Table 2 with the model from Table 3, it appears that 
the effect of N S D A P propaganda intensity is greater in the second model . If the 
activity of the right-wing parties is above average, according to Figure 5 the 
difference in the N S D A P increase between communities without N S D A P 
meetings and communities with 10 meetings per 1000 eligible voters amounts 
to approximately 11 percentage points. In Figure 4 we saw the corresponding 
effect of N S D A P meetings to lie around 7 percentage points with a nationalistic 
potential of 40 percent, and around 9 percentage points with a nationalistic 
potential of 50 percent. It should be noted, though, that, due to 
multicollinearity, the propaganda effects of the second model might be 
somewhat inflated as the productterm and each of the two component variables 
had to be specified. 2 9 Two further aspects are noteworthy in comparing the two 
conditional models. First, the conditional model with the nationalistic potential 
as the conditioning factor has a slightly higher R 2 . Secondly, it is the more 
parsimonious model of the two. 
The model which sees the nationalistic potential as the decisive condition for 
an impact of Nazi party propaganda seems thus, overall, to be preferable on 
statistical and methodological grounds. Additionally, in contrast to the 
traditional right-wing parties it could be postulated a priori in which way the 
nationalistic potential would modify an effect of NSDAP meetings. However, 
the conditional model focussing on the propaganda of the N S D A P ' s right-wing 
rivals should not be discarded. Rather, both conditional models offer valuable 
insights and should be construed as alternative perspectives on the possible 
All variables in Table 2, with the except ion of the d u m m y variable for the county of 
Bensheim, are rat io scaled. Thus , for the analysis presented in Table 2 it was possible 
to model a condit ional effect without including all two main effects (Jaccard et al. 
1990; Thome 1991). 
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effects of National Socialist propaganda. While the first model emphasizes the 
importance of ideological proximity between propagandists and recipients for 
N S D A P propaganda to be effective, the second model lays the stress on the 
public political meetings of competing parties which were indistinguishable 
from the National Socialists in terms of their political ideology. 3 0 
4. Conclusion 
Every analysis of propaganda effects on voting behavior has to deal with severe 
methodological problems. This is true in particular for the case of N S D A P 
propaganda during the Weimar Republic, as aggregate data must be used for 
empirical analysis (Ohr 1997: 66-80) . Consequently, finding a positive 
relationship between N S D A P propaganda and the electoral rise of the National 
Socialists does only weakly indicate that propaganda indeed had a causal effect. 
Keeping these limits of every empirical analysis of propaganda effects in 
mind, we can return to our main question from the b e g i n n i n g : How and to what 
extent did the campaign propaganda of the NSDAP contribute to the par ty 's 
rise in the Weimar elections? Summarizing the results of the preceding 
analysis, a strong and significant effect of the NSDAP ' s campaign intensity in 
1931 on the party 's electoral increase between 1930 and 1931 could be 
established. Given this finding, the impact of N S D A P propaganda on the 
party 's rise is very unlikely to be a »myth« (Bessel 1980). Having shown that 
the political meetings of the N S D A P did influence voting behavior does not 
mean, however, that large parts of the German electorate were manipulated and 
seduced by National Socialist propaganda. Generally, if manipulation by 
political propaganda is postulated, it is implicitly assumed that voters are 
moved against their own and, supposedly, ' real ' convict ions. 3 1 Whereas a 
hypothesis of manipulation thus assumes a gap between propagandists and the 
recipients which can be closed by means of manipulative propaganda, the main 
finding of our analysis suggests an entirely different interpretation. 
National Socialist Propaganda could induce voters to switch to the NSDAP. 
But the impact of National Socialist campaign activities on the party 's electoral 
increase seems to be clearly dependent on the ideological preferences of the 
voters. An effect of the NSDAP ' s public activities was most likely if the voters ' 
ideological preferences were in line with the ideological themes of Nazi party 
propaganda. Conducting its campaign propaganda with an extremely high 
intensity, the N S D A P succeeded in improving its image in the nationalistic part 
of the electorate. Having achieved an »image of de t e rmina t ion (Hennig 1983; 
The nationalistic potential and the dichotomous indicator for the campaign propa-
ganda of the traditional right-wing parties correlate with +0.42. 
For this argument and a critical appraisal of a manipulat ion hypothesis see Paul 
(1990: 15-16) . 
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Kershaw 1983; Richter 1986; Paul 1990), the N S D A P more and more appeared 
to be the only option for nationalistic voters if compared with the traditional 
right-wing parties. The conditional effects of N S D A P propaganda we found in 
the empirical analysis strongly support this interpretation. 
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